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By William D. Graf 
When constitutions are made, insights are also provided into the 
constellation of social and economic forces prevailing within the country 
concerned. Charters of government ostensibly promulgated on behalf of the 
people, like laws executed "in the name of the people" and proclamations 
invoking the "people's will, 11 tend everywhere to entrench particularist 
interests and goals. In less developed countries, particularly those which 
have opted for the capitalist road to development and where therefore large 
income differentials, severely restricted access to the structures of power 
and privilege, unequal regional and sectoral development and a high degree of 
actual or potential class conflict exist, 1 constitutions generally are 
less representative of any nebulous "popular will 11 than of very specific class 
interests. 
Starting from these assumptions, this paper sets out to analyze the 
evolution of the Nigerian elite from its collapse at the end of the First 
Republic, its transformation under military hegemony, to its emergence since 
the civil war as a self-confidant, relatively autonomous, relatively coherent 
stratum with interests and objectives of a national scope - and indeed, as 
will be seen, already evidencing a number of supra-national dimensions. This 
changing basis of elite-formation, which of course corresponds with the 
developing political economy, finds its political expression most plastically 
in the constitutional order of Nigeria's Second Republic, both in the process 
of constitution making itself and in the institutions, processes and 
ideologies which it prescribes for the Nigerian polity. 
The argument 2 to be advanced here may he simplified somewhat if its 
main historical tenets are reduced to a number of assumptions, namely: 
that contemporary elite-formation in Nigeria originated in, and is 
still affected by the process of elite-creation under colonial administration, 
a process which, however, was conditioned by the respective pre-colonial 
social and political cultures; 
that elite-formation was therefore particularly determined by the 
pol icy of "indirect rule, 11 the exploitative and sectoralized colonial enclave 
economy, that the differentiatial rate of exposure of Nigerians to 
western-capitalist influences; 
-- that the stark elite-mass distinction which antedated independence was 
enhanced as Nigerians moved into the top positions in government and 
administration (but not in the economy) following the departure of the 
colonists; 
-- that the new elite thus sought to preserve 
intact rather than to transform them, which 
"unfinished" independence for the ruled classes; 
colonial ruling structures 
implied an illusory of 
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-- that the regionalized governmental structure of the First Republic, 
combined with an objective need for socio-economic reforms and redistribution 
- which the elites were unable to effect since these would have undermined 
their power base - led to a resort to ethnicity (or "tribalism") as a negative 
unifying ideology; 
-- that a major contradiction developed from the situation in which the 
need for parties and politicians to achieve power at the center was frustrated 
by the impossibility of transcending their local, ethnic-group or regional 
reservoir of popular support; 
-- that this contradiction produced a further one between the need for 
intra-elite solidarity (in order to gain access to state power which could be 
used to secure the elite's economic status as well as to prevent the growth of 
opposition or protest movements from "below") versus the debilitating and 
dysfunctional intra-elite competition for scarce resources (patronage, 
appointments, privileges ) which was caused by the need to satisfy demands 
emanating from the elites' ethnic or regional constituencies; and 
-- that as a result of these contradictions the machinery for intra- and 
inter-elite conflict resolution was patently inadequate and, by 1966, could 
only be rectified via external (military) intervention. 
Military Correctives 
The military's active intervention in political life, which began with the 
January and July 1966 coups, did succeed in resolving some of these 
contradictions (center versus regional royalties, intra- vs. inter-elite 
pulls) through the simple expedient of removing the political class from power 
and banning all political and ethnic activities and associations. But it came 
too late to prevent the forces generated by these conflicts from proceeding to 
their logical denouement. 
Indeed, quite contrary to the military's self-proclaimed concilitating and 
corrective function, its (objective) pre-civil war role in resolving the 
immanent class contradictions proved to be that of an agency for exacerbating 
and heightening them, a role for which the military, given its delicate 
internal ethno-regional balance, its lack of sensitive feedback and 
self-regulating mechanisms and its near-monopoly of the means of violence, was 
exceptionally well suited. The first coup, for example, was intended to 
suppress the ethnosectional rivalries and incorrigible regionalism which had 
immobilized the civilian government. Yet the subsequent inter-ethnic 
conflicts which were reproduced within the army resulted, in the second coup 
and its attendant ethnic conflagrations, in violence more intense and brutal 
than had ever been produced during the civilian regime. The massacres of the 
Igbo in the North, partially incited and carried out by the soldiers, as well 
as the many crimes committed by military personnel during and after the civil 
war and the notorious susceptibility of the officer cadres to bribery and 
corruption hardly vindicate the notion of the military as corrective. It was, 
furthermore, military elites who actually instigated the civil war and were 
instrumental in prosecuting it. 
However, the sequence of events from coup to counter-coup and intra-
military purges, from the abortive attempt to restore unitarism to the 
multi-state (in 1967: 12; in 1976: 19) federalist solution, and from attempted 
secession to the "re-unification" achieved through the civil war, did 
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collectively produce a limited "corrective" to inter-elite, inter-ethnic, and 
inter-regional conflict. In order to wage the war, the central government 
increasingly assumed more powers at the expense of the peripheral political 
sub-units, a trend which obviously was facilitated by the centralist, 
hierarchical nature of the military command structure. This developemnt alone 
countered the centrifugality of the former power-distribution system. In 
particular, the prosecution of the war necessitated a re-orientation of the 
economy. To achieve greater efficiency and enhanced self-sufficiency, it was 
necessary to centralize and streamline the legal-administrative apparatus 
which, for its part, was thus enabled to undertake a number of vital refonns 
such as increased import-substitution, protectionism, restrictive trade 
measures and the adoption of new policy priorities. This amounted to a fairly 
comprehensive, albeit initially ad hoc, program of state intervention in and 
control of the essential sec to;. ~ the economy which, though begun as a 
measure of expediency, proved to be unexpectedly effective in terms of 
enhanced efficiency and generation of surplus capital. 3 
The end of the civil war roughly co-incided with the beginning of the 
massive extraction of oil in and around the Niger Delta area. If by 1971/72 
oil revenues accounted for about half of all government revenue, by 1975/76, 
following the first OPEC price escalation, they made up about 93% of export 
earnings, 4 a percentage which has since held more or less constant. Total 
federal revenues were collected by the central government and distributed, 
according to varying formulae, to the various States, so that by 1977/78 the 
center was disbursing some 87.6% of the States' total revenue and in 1978/78 a 
high of 94.6%.5 
The combination of wartime rationalization and centralization of the 
economy and the revenues generated by the oil bonanza has led, in the decade 
following the civil war, to a qualitative transformation of the Nigerian 
political economy. It bas been a period characterized above all by an 
increasing, and increasingly active, state involvement in the economy, 
particularly in the interrelated processes of industrialization and 
indigenization, an era which Peter Waterman calls "the period of peripheral 
capitalist industrialization 116 and which r.v. Sledzevski t 1rms "a special stage in the development of state capitalism in Nigeria." Both authors 
are attempting conceptually to come to terms with the fact that the Nigerian 
economy since 1970 bas gone beyond its neo-lassez-faire, open door pbase--or 
"the robber baron phase of regionalized, tribalized and centrifugal commercial 
capitalist competition 118--into a new stage of state-sponsored, but still 
dependent (or "peripheral") industrialization, along the capitalist road to 
development and within the framework of a more genuinely 11national" economy. 
This "national II orientation of the political economy is central to the 
line of argument to be developed in the rest of this paper. For by war's end 
the more narrowly political class of regional and local party politicians had 
been swept aside and, where they were able to remain in government service at 
all, e.g., in the role of civilian commissioners or as members of consultative 
bodies such as Gowon' s "leaders of thought" or as co-opted members of State 
cabinets, were reduced to a subordinate position. 9 With the decline in 
the politicians' powers control over economy and society passed to a 
non-elected, non-responsible--but nevertheless "national" and "rational"--
coalition of military officers and civil servants (increasingly allied with 
and penetrated by representatives of indigenous business concerns and of 
multi-national corporations) whose legitimacy derived from their pledge to 
restore honesty, efficiency and order to political 
will and capacity to remove the socio-economic 
immobilized the civilian government. 
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life and their ostensible 
contradictions wbich had 
The foundation of the new triangular elite alliance 10 of military, 
civil service and big business, just as during the period of decolonization 
and the First Republic, was the desire to control state power and through it 
to influence the further course of economic development. This time, however, 
the alliance excluded the factionalist core of popularly-elected, 
locally-based politicians and, buoyed by oil revenues, was not hampered to the 
same degree by scarcity and distribution problems. In a sense, the alliance 
between the soldiers and civil servants was a "natural II one, since both groups 
occupied a similar soci"al-structural position as members of the "intendant" 
classes and as such tended to share certain attitudes and orientations, such 
as career- mindedness, hierarchical organization, "non-political" ethos and a 
national outlook. Moreover, if the Nigerian military, like military regimes 
virtually everywhere, 11 had to turn to the civil servants to find the 
administrative personnel, expertise and at least a modicum of the responsive 
capacity which it lacked, the bureaucrats, under the military aegis, stood to 
extend their scope of authority and power, and to move closer to the centers 
of income generation and distribution, thus in some measure moving into the 
vacuum left by the proscribed politicians--but simultaneously taking on many 
of the latter's problems, as will be demonstrated below. 
Centralist by organization and outlook, relatively unimpeded by local or 
regional claims and pressures, frequently guided by ideals of nationalism or 
national greatness, and standing to advance their careers considerably, the 
military-civil service coalition set about "correcting" Nigeria's factional, 
divisive and therefore dysfunctional development by means of far-reaching and 
comprehensive programs of consolidation and centralization. 
Politically, the creation of 12, then 19 States in place of the former 
four regions on the one hand offered most minority groups formerly under the 
hegemony of one of the three major ethnic groups the prospect of socio-
cultural autonomy, thereby increasing their loyalty to, or at least a greater 
acceptance of, the federal government; while on the other hand it broke down 
the regional power blocks and, coupled with greated revenue control at the 
center, ensured that each of the States would in effect remain client States 
of the federal government, forced now to look to the center for leadership, 
economic planning and overall development. A by-product of the exercise was, 
of course, a rapid growth of the civil service establishment as the total 
number of governments increased from five, to 13 and finally to 20. At the 
same time the States' former independent lawmaking powers, as embodied by the 
old concurrent legislative lists, were arrogated by the center. 
Administratively, the civil service machinery reflected the principle of 
federal supremacy. A sustained effort was made to recruit top personnel into 
the federal civil service, which was now considered primary. Among other 
incentives, the federal civil servants were offered higher wages and better 
conditions of service. For the first time, Nigerians from all over the 
federation were attracted into the national civil service in large numbers: 
southern-based civil servants who saw the federal apparatus as the best avenue 
to enhance career prospects, since it was expanding more than twelve times as 
rapidly as the State bodies, and "progressive" Northern bureaucrats who saw in 
federal penetration into the North a source of new opportunities for 
advancement as well as a means of undernnining the power of encursted 
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traditional authorities and thus of accelerating the process of 
development • 12 And finally, a number of inter-governmental administrative 
institutions--e.g., the Nigerian Council for Science and Technology, the 
Medical Research Council, Agricultural Research Council, Natural Resources 
Research Council--were " .. . created ostensibly to provide avenues of Federal-
State consultation and cooperation but actuallY, to provide additional pressure 
points for integration and federal dominance. 11 I 3 
Educationally, primary and secondary education were made 
"concurrent" list in 1973, thus, as has been shown, effectively 
under federal control. Institutions of higher education were at 
made an exclusively federal province. 
part of the 
bringing them 
the same time 
Economically, finally, the federal government moved into a leading role. 
Independent State powers of revenue-raising were, firstly, eroded as economic 
power accrued to the center. Separate taxation and customs/excises automatic 
revenues based on derivation, and other income sources conducive to economic 
regionalization were systematically abolished. Noteworthy here was the 1973 
conversion of the marketing board--once a staple regional income source--into 
federal agencies no longer concerned wiht generating surpluses for regional 
government use, but now with promoting agrarian production and productivity 
and with encouraging more equal regional development. Secondly, the 
development planning process was systematized and centralized. In place of 
individual State plans, there was now a single Federal Plan, formulated by a 
Central Planning Office in Lagos, working with the State Planning Offices and 
the National Economic Advisory Council, and collaborating with other 
consultative bodies such as the Joint Planning Boards, the Federal Executive 
Council, etc. 14 Thirdly, the state's economic role now became more 
extensive and intensive, entering nto such key spheres as banking, insuranc~, 
imports, foreign exchange and basic production, and especially into those 
areas in which Nigerian entrepreneurs lacked experience and/or financial 
power. In particular, the state moved rapidly into the "structure-forming" 
spheres of the economy, 15 namely these--crucial--branches of industry with 
a high capital intensity and gradual capital circulation. This concentration 
on the basic industries is important, for it demonstrates the foreseen role of 
state capitalism as a motor for economic development with the object of 
creating an independent industrial base characterized by extensive import 
substitution and sustained attempts at technology transfer. 
These aspects of the evolution of Nigeria's political economy--
centralization of economic control, development planning and active state role 
in industrialization--define the context of a much-misunderstood and 
much-misinterpreted phenomenon: economic nationalism or "indigenization. 11 
Economic Nationalism 
The policy of "indigenization" or of transferring the ownership, 
management and control of commerical and industrial enterprises from foreign 
into Nigerian hands, parallels in the economic sphere what nationalism and 
independence were to the realm of politics. 
A general commitment to indigenization was first anchored in the Second 
National Development Plan 16 and the policy has been executed through the 
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree (NEPD) of February 1972, later 
intensified by a 1977 Decree attending the report of the Industrial 
Enterprises Panel. The policy represented a conscious attempt to increase the 
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state's leading role in the economy by taking a direct hand in production, 
especially in large-scale, long-tenn investments, by buying shares in some 
industries while aiding individual Nigerians to purchase shares in others, and 
by participating directly in industrial development--all this "in order to 
ensure that the economic destiny of Nigeria is detennined by Nigerians 
themselves." 
The strategy of indigenization consisted, and consists, largely of 
compelling foreign concerns, within an overall framework of national 
development planning, to sell off their Nigerian operations to indigenous 
businessmen, civil servants, the general public and--as a last resort--the 
State and Federal governments. The extent of indigenous control is dependent 
upon the perceived capacity of local personnel to assume the direction of the 
branch of industry concerned. Thus the ratio varies (in tenns of the 1977 
Decree) from 100 percent Nigerian ownership/control of retail trade, light 
manufacturing and most low-technology service firms (schedule 1) through at 
least 60 percent Nigerian participation in more technology-intensive 
manufacturing and fiscal sectors such as insurance (schedule 2) to a minimum 
40 percent Nigerian ownership of shares in high-technology manufacturing and 
industry. A number of objectives underlay this strategy, among them the 
desire of Nigerian businessmen to reverse the process of foreign domination of 
certain sectors of the economy, the experience of the civil war which showed 
that foreign economic interests do not always coincide with Nigerian political 
interests, and the "demonstration effect" of similar developments in other 
African states. 17 
The notion of indigenization, in the context of capitalist development, 
however, ought not to be interpreted literally, for it does not aim at a 
consistent "nationalization"--defined here as a transfer from foreign to 
Nigerian ownership--of the political economy. What is intended, is the 
transfonnation of the Nigerian economy to a different or "higher" level of 
dependency. The country's unabated need for foreign investment and technology 
transfer has been underlined by each succeeding military government. If 
General Gowon in 1973 spoke of "attracting more investment in sectors of the 
economy where Nigerians are not yet able to rely on themselves," 18 then 
Brigadier Garba, foreign minister under the Muhamrned/Obasanjo regime, assured 
foreign and indigenous capitalists that "all we are trying to do is blend 
indigenous enterprise and capital with foreign capital, technology and 
management in such a way as to ensure fairness to foreigners and Nigerians 
alike.nl9 
To round off Collins' argument, then, indigenization can be seen, less as 
an attempt to use state power to overcome the substantial economic problems 
which persist in the political economy--regional inbalances in the 
distribution and utilization of human and natural resources, huge urban-rural 
and upper class-lower class income differentials and discrepancies between the 
public and private sectors 20 --than as "an attempt to secure a certain 
position for growing elite or private entrepreneurs whilst at the same time 
preservinf the dominant place for foreign capital elsewhere in the industrial 
sector. 112 Thus indigenization has fostered an "indigenous I capitalism' 
within a framework of continued dependence on foreign enterprise in many 
sectors. 1122 
It is self-evident that indigenization policies, as defined here, must 
have profound effects upon elite-formation. 
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The "nationalization" of selected sectors of the economy cannot be equated 
with the socialization" of the economy in general. Indigenization is part of 
an overall program of capitalist development, i.e., development within the 
parameters of the given socio-economic order. It is not, and has never 
aspired to be, a program of social and economic redistribution and 
transfonnation geared toward the resolution of the structural contradictions 
alluded to above. 
For the capitalist road to development posits inequality of rewards, 
private capital accumulation and hence socio-economic inequalities as guiding 
principles; and the necessity of state intervention to strengthen indigenous 
capital vis-a-vis foreign capital and to compensate for the weakness or 
inexperience of local capitalists is part of the overall conception. It is 
true that from colonial times onward, the government has owned or controlled 
large sectors of the economy, primarily in the infrastructure and other non-
profit-generating areas, and this phenomenon has led to some economists and 
others to speak of a "mixed" economy. But when one considers that public 
investment--particularly massive public investment since the onset of the oil 
boom--is largely governed and shaped by private interests and that the crucial 
profit-producing sectors are mostly in private hands, the notion of a 2artly 
socialist, partly capitalist "mixed" economy is a misleading one. 23 The 
Nigerian road to dvelopment has been and remains an unambiguously dependent 
capitalist one. The imbalances thus perpetuated--between foreign and 
indigenous economic control, between the elite and the masses, and between the 
wealthier and poorer regions--collectively constitute considerable obstacles 
to further development. 
The fact that the takeover of, or achievement of equity in, foreign 
enterprises has been accomplished through private capital, has meant that 
those elites closest to the state machinery who either own capital or have 
access to the--largely state owned--lending institutons are by far the 
greatest beneficiaries of indigenization. 24 But the corollary of this, 
namely that the transfer of ownership/control has not involved any improvement 
in productivity or economic performance, but had led to the evolution of a 
kind of "drone capitalism" 25 dependent still upon the state and foreign 
capital, indicates that the modality of indigenization may require some form 
of "corrective." 
The social classes emerging from this economic structure have been aptly 
called--and here Collins' argument can be taken up again--an "auxiliary 
bourgeoisie 1126 existing in the bureaucratic, managerial and commercial 
sectors. This auxiliary bourgeoisie consists, first, of Nigerians who have 
bought shares in the large public companies (schedule 2, 1972; schedules 2 and 
3 1977). Upper-level civil servants in particular, with their better access 
to credit and information and their direct links with foreign companies, have 
become the "cadre of the emergent share-owning class." 27 Second, leading 
Nigerian executives of foreign-owned companies have also acquired large 
shareholdings in public companies, especially--often through stock options and 
special bonuses--in the companies which employ them. They are joined by, 
thirdly, a number of large-scale businessmen and relatively wealthy 
professional people--but seldom by top military personnel, who tend to prefer 
the "quick-gain" sectors such as contracting. 28 A fourth auxiliary 
category derives from Nigerians employed in the smaller foreign private 
companies which were not made public corporations and hence not subject to 
direct government surveillance. The social background of these share-owners 
is somewhat more heterogeneous and includes "top civil servants, 
8 
professionals, big businessmen, some military officers, traditional rulers' 
families, former politicians, state commissioners and employees and 
distributors of companies selling the shares." 29 Thus Collins rightly 
sees as one of the major effect o'f indigenizaton "a tightening nexus between 
government and foreign capital," which he describes in this way: 
On the one hand important sections of the bureaucratic and 
managerial bourgeoisie have been coopted as shareholders, 
while on the other chosen members of the commercial 
bourgeoisie have secured a niche in the alien-dominated 
distributive network and therefore tied in, as satellites, 
through the latter's monopoly of supplies and credit. The 
state must now protect even more the interests of foreign 
capital in which the local bourgeoisie has a stake. 
It is thus evident that indigenization I s primary social function is to 
enhance the position of the national bourgeoisie. It is neither productive 
nor redistributive. As such, economic nationalism--like political 
nationalism, like ethnicity--is an ersatz ideology. While in fact entrenching 
the socio-economic status quo and excluding the non-propertied classes, it 
presents the illusion of a genuine, progressive and participatory economic 
· 1· 31 . nat1ona ism aimed at accelerating development and economic 
independence. This still-unresolved contradiction--between ideological 
egalitarianrism and de facto elite-formation--leads, among other things, to a 
clash between certain developmental goals set by the Second and Third National 
Development Plans, i.e. the goal of a "just and egalitarian society" and that 
of "a land of bright and full opportunities for all citizens." In terms of 
access to economic opportun1t1es, indigenization, by favoring owners of 
capital, negates economic egalitarianism while proclaiming the fictive 
existence of a broad range of opportunities for all citizens. The 
contradiction (and a logical solution to it) is defined by 0. Aboyade: 
The public sector take-over of the ownership and control 
of foreign enterprises, on the other band, could have 
simultaneously achieved both objectives and, as a starting 
point, also help in achieving the other three of the now 
famous five national objectives. Part of the recent 
doubts and confusion can be traced to this incongrous, if 
not ludicrous, situation of a people (or rather their 
government) trying to pursue socialist ends with 
capitalist instruments.32 
Correcting the Corrective 
Lacking any system-transforming "mission," by nature unresponsive to 
popular opinion and demands, and internally cross-pressured as a result of its 
accession to political power, the military government--every military 
government from 1966-1979--was under a strong compulsion to "return to the 
barracks" after its immediate post-coup "corrective" objectives had been 
accomplished. 
Once the Gowon regime had re-asserted the national unity through the 
successful conclusion of the civil war, the creation of a new system of 
federalism and the centralization of power at the center, and had laid the 
groundwork for a more functional national capitalism, it lost its historical 
raison d'etre and had to face a rising opposition from inside and outside the 
government. 
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Conflict within the military itself developed largely from out of the 
nature of the "dual constituency" of the military leadership, namely the 
interests and objectives of the "politicized" group of governors, cabinet 
members and other directly involved in government--never more than 100 
officers at any one time--and the great majority of the ranks who remained 
outside the political system looking in. Cohesion was initially not a 
problem: fighting the war and providing grearter amenities and enhanced 
benefits to the military ensured inner-military solidarity. But during 
peacetime the "political" officers became progressively alienated from their 
original military constituency as they were integrated into the political 
class and engaged in the latter's self-aggrandizing and often corrupt 
practices--10 of the 12 State governors under the Gowon regime were eventually 
found guilty of gross miappropriation of funds--while the non-governing 
military both deplored the resultant declining prestige of the army and 
frequently engaged in intense competition for lucrative political 
appointments. Thus, far from their popular image as a united moral force 
operating "above politics, 11 the Nigerian military were, in fact, rent by a 
number of internal "political" cleavages. The vehemence of intra-military 
conflict is underlined by Martin Dent who writes that "of the 300 or so 
officers with regular commissions in January 1966, something like 60 have been 
killed by their brother officers in the course of carrying out coups or 
executed following unsuccessful coups." 33 
Conflicts were also produced within the governing coalition of military 
officers and civil servants. As the civil servants moved into policy making, 
rather than policy-executing, positions, they too had become "politicized" and 
highly visible. As in the case of the military, the civil service also 
developed an internal contradicton between those who desired to maintain the 
politically neutral, efficient and rationalized organization, and those who 
sought an even greater voice in political decision-making and with it an 
increasing share of government "outputs ... 34 In the absence of popularly 
chosen political mediating agencies, the civil service, as it thus moved 
toward increasing political involvement, encountered criticism and opposition 
of an unanticipated nature: 
The increasing visibility of the civil service and the 
perception among elites and nonelites in Nigeria that the 
civil service was a political actor made the civil service 
more vulnerable to the housecleaning that a new military 
leadership undertook in 1975. The civil service was now 
part of the political fray and thus fairer game. As some 
civil servants feared, the political activity of civil 
servants weakened the civil service as an institution. 
Some high level servants who were closely linked with the 
Gowon regime were not tolerated by the Mohammed regime. 
Low level civil servants and high level ones too became 
convenient scapegoats for a military regime itself 
vulnerable to the charges of corrupt practices. 35 
A third conflict, also within the ruling classes, then developed as those 
groups who, although constituting an integral part of the socio-economic 
elite, did not enjoy a corresponding share of political power. In particular, 
the class of large entrepreneurs and indigenous managers of multi-national 
corporations sought to rectify this imbalance between economic and political 
power to compensate for the top civil servants' inside track in the 
indigenization sweepstakes and to gain access to other sources of state 
largesse. 
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Moreover, as the postwar political economy expanded and adapted in the 
directions described above, it objectively required a broader basis of 
participation and decentralization of resource allocation function and 
adaptable institutions to contain and resolve intra-elite conflicts. The 
Gowan regime, however, beholden as it was to a narrow-based clique of top 
military officials, civil servants, big businessmen and leading MNC managers 
and their foreign sponsors, could not realise such reforms, since doing so 
would have undermined the power base upon which it rested. 
If to these interrelated contradictions--intra-military conflicts, 
intra-bureaucracy differences, civil service-military, and civil-service-
business rivalries, and growing ossification of the conflict-resolving 
capacities of government--one adds factors of gross mismanagement (ports 
congestion, botched 1973 census, inflation, deficient infrastructures), 
corruption (cement scandal, events in Benue-Plateau State) and a general (and 
unquantifyable) weariness of military rule among the populace, then the 
palpable sense of relief following the 1975 coup is readily understandible. 
Or, in the words of L.N. Pribytkowski, 
••• to the extent that (the military regimes) became 
economically and politically entrenched, the current 
ruling military group allied itself with the bureaucratic 
bourgeoisie and lost its mass basis of support in the 
country. The tendency toward the political degeneration 
of the military regime was particularly pronounced under 
the rule of the group led by Y. Gowon. Originating as a 
government of national salvation, this group in time 
oriented itself primarily to the interests of the owning 
and exploiting classes and transformed itself into a 
clique which ruled beyond all control, enriched itself and 
objectively acted in o:fJ'osition to the interests of the 
majority of the people. 
Transition without Transformation 
The Mohammed-Obasanjo military government was not revolutionary. It like 
its predecessor, was a "corrective" which set out, within the parameters of 
the socio-economic status quo, to inject efficiency, honesty and therefore 
resiliency into the existing system. 
In terms of these objectives, the regime was remarkably successful. It 
was able to resolve or at least allay a number of intra-elite contradictions 
by setting a firm timetable for military withdrawal from politics, while at 
the same time increasing the army's preeminence within the ruling coalition. 
The latter goal was largely achieved by the expedient of a massive purge of 
the bureaucracy, 37 by further reducing the State governments' powers in 
favor of heightened centralism and by embarking on an anti-corruption, 
pro-discipline crusade throughout the nation. The eventual result of these 
manoeuvers, and the composition of the Second Republic's ruling classes now 
demonstrates, was to pave the way for a greater rationalization of the elite 
structure. The army bas resolved most of its own internal tensions while 
remaining one of the major ruling groups and not in jeopardy of losing its 
benefits and privileges; the civil service has withdrawn from its overtly 
political role; the national bourgeoisie have obtained a substantial share of 
political power; and a new group of professional politicians, organically 
linked to the latter two groups, has re-entered the elite coalition. As 
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intended, the political apparatus has remained a conflict-enacting and 
-regulating agency whose aim " ... is to rationalize the purchase of state favor 
and the conversion of public resources to private advantage, not to eliminate 
it."38 
In view of the pronounced system-immanent character of the military 
itself, it is understandable that the civilian successor regime should display 
marked affinities with it. First, as is well known, departing military 
governors will seldom transfer power to civilians whose outlooks, 
socio-economic backgrounds and political Weltanschauungen are too dissimilar 
to their own, since they will be concerned about policy reversals, loss of 
perquisites or even possible trials, retributive acts, etc.39 
Thus the military aimed at shaping and influencing the transition to 
civilian rule at every important stage. For example, the February 1976 
creation of seven new States, the 1975-1976 local government reforms and the 
1977 Electoral Decree all represented military pre-emption of decisions which, 
strictly speaking, ought to have been taken within the new civilian 
governmental process (meaning also within the terms of reference of the 
Constituent Assembly). Similarly, the head of state, convening the 
constitution-making body, virtually prescribed a presidential structure, a 
system of federalism, public accountability, a multi-party system and in 
general, a liberal-democratic constitutional order, 40 while proscribing 
the adoption of "any particular philosophy or ideology" from the constitution. 
Of particular interest in this context is the constitution-making process 
itself, for through it the structure of the Second Republic, and the elites' 
hegemonial position within it, were definitively determined. The details of 
that process and of the two bodies which accomplished it, the Constitution 
Drafting Committee (CDC) and the Constituent Assembly (CA) are well 
known,4 1 and need not be reiterated here. 
Much has been made of the notion of popular participation in the process 
of constitution-making. The preamble to the 1979 constitution asserts that 
"we the people of the Federal Republic of Nigeria ••• do hereby make, enact and 
give to ourselves the following constitution." No doubt, when compared with 
the arbitrary and occasionally ill-considered decrees handed down over time by 
the Supreme Military Council, the new constitution stands as a relatively 
democratically produced and legitimized document. But an examination of the 
composition of the CDC and the CA, as well as the solutions they have laid 
down, reveals Nigerian constitution-making to have been less an act of the 
people than an intra-elite affair. 
The CDC, the body which prepared the substance of the ultimate 
constitution between September 1975 and September 1976, was an appointed group 
of 49 experts which was never intended to be representative of "the people." 
According to the then head of state, only a limited geographic representation 
(at least two members per State) was sought, as well as token (not 
proportional) ethnic-group representation. Beyond this, "expertise" or 
"eminence" in relevant academic disciplines or spheres of society were the 
deciding criteria of selection. The composition of the CA, to be sure, was 
somewhat more representative. Of its 230 members, 40 were ex-officio or 
other (arbitrary) appointments of the Federal Military Government. The 
remaining members were elected indirectly through a system of electoral 
colleges based largely on local government units--95 on the basis of 
geographic representation or 5 per state (an embryonic Senate?), and 95 on the 
basis of representation by population (House of Representatves?) 
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Two representative imbalances resulted from this selection system: a 
geographical imbalance weighted in favor of the smaller States, so that a 
citizen from say, Rivers or Lagos was three to four times "more" representated 
than a citizen from one of the larger States such as Oyo or Kano, 4 2 within 
the CA. In toto, the North was considerably underrepresented vis-a-vis the 
South. Within the CDC too, representation was of course also skewed in favor 
of urban male intellectuals from the upper social classes. 
The second representative imbalance in the Constituent Assembly was 
sociological. Both the CDC and CA were constituted of leading members of the 
Nigerian ruling classes. What has been said of the CDC applies equally, 
mutatis mutandis to the CA, namely that its members derived "• •• exclusively 
from among the elements of the national bourgeoisie; lawyers, medical 
practitioners, businessmen, administrators, university dons and company 
directors • .,4 3 At least 14 of the 49 CDC members had beem prominently 
involved in political party activity in the First Republic and four of its 
seven subcommittees were chaired by these politicians. 44 A large number 
of members had also served as consultants and administrators under the Federal 
Military Government. And within the CA, 120 of 230 M.C.A. 's were 
lawyers. 45 Neither body included a worker, peasant, artisan, employee or 
market woman among its membership, and only the CA admitted a token student 
representative. If one considers that surely not less than 90 percent of the 
Nigerian population may be subsumed under the latter six social classes, then 
the unrepresentative quality of these two constitution-making bodies is 
sel £-evident. The absence of representatives from these groups must have 
deprived the new constitutional order of some important perspectives. For 
example: 
The Nigerian working-class movement has veterans with 
several decades of dedication to the cause of workers and 
vast political experience. The Nigerian peasantry also 
have cooperatives and farmers' associations which have not 
in any way been silent on the aspirations and interests of 
the peasantry ••• 
• • • The exclusion of the Nigerian workers and farmers 
from the constitution-making process becomes indeed 
revealing when it is recognized that simultaneously as the 
CDC was being constituted, the labor movement was under a 
governmental probe which ultimately led to an as yet 
unexplained ban on the most militant labor unionists with 
well-known left wing connections.46 
Demonstrating the pronounced upper-class composition of these 
"pre-parliaments" is however one part of the argument. The second part is to 
show how and why the CDC and CA operated logically and consistently in these 
class' interest. This second part, however, must first be qualified 
somewhat. The two bodies were not solely and exclusively "agents" of the 
ruling classes, nor did they deliberately and unanimously preceed to override 
the other classes' interests while entrenching their own. Three developments 
militate against any such simplistic explanation of this rather more complex 
phenomenon: 
1) Both bodies contained a miniscule left-wing opposition whose espousal 
of radical and to some extent anti-capitalist positions may be seen as 
evidence of the (indirect) interest representation of the non-bourgeois 
classes. Two dissenting members of the CDC, Drs. Osoba and Usman, wrote in 
13 
their Minority Report that the CDC majority displayed " ••• A basic commitment, 
sometimes thinly disguised and sometimes blatantly expressed, to the 
consolidation and perpetuation of the neo-colonialist capitalist social and 
economic order in Nigeria. 114 7 Se gun Okeowo, head of the since banned 
National Union of Students and by virtue of that position a member of the CA 
(but subsequently imprisoned and suspended from that body in connection with 
the student deomonstrations of April/May 1978), argued that the draft 
constitution represented a "perpetuation of class distinction and .•. of what we 
call bourgeois constitutionalism. 11 47 
2) Similarly, the formation of a purely single-class will was mitigated by 
the "federal character" of delegate selection to the CDC and CA--a highly 
significant factor in Nigeria where, in the past, ethnic regional differences 
have tended to be confused with the class struggle. 
3) And further the extensive and frequently acrimonous debates, 
particularly those in the more representative CA, which occasioned protests, 
petitions and even a walk-out by 92 of its members, and its adjournment sine 
die without a vote on at least two controversial issues, are evidence of an 
absence of any overt issue solidarity among Nigerian constitution-makers. 
Some insight into the differentiated class composition and nature of the 
constitution-making bodies may be gained by recalling that Constituent 
Assembly members were both united and divided on a number of issues. The CA 
was more or less unanimous that socialism, social reforms and socio-economic 
rights should be kept out of the constitution; that the provisions of the Land 
Use Decree should he mitigated by reference to rights of private property; 
that no concrete measures should be taken to extend popular ownership of 
stocks and shares in "indigenized" corporations; that elected public servants 
should be permitted to maintain foreign bank accounts; and that government and 
civil service agencies should display a "federal character" in their personnel 
composition. On the other hand, some issues were the subject of protracted 
and vehement debate: the creation of a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal; the 
question of whether to ban politicians previously convicted of corruption, 
from political life, and if so, whether to ban those convicted after October 
1960 or January 1966; and the creation of more States. Notably absent from 
the deliberations was a third category of issues: those which were ignored or 
omitted. Thus the CA never came to grips at all with the problems of 
neo-colonialism and economic dependency, maldistribution among the social 
classes and the ways and means of realizing the "fundamental objectives and 
directives of state policy." 
A tentative explanation of these ostensibly inconsistent issue 
orientations may be advanced with the model, suggested earlier, of intra-class 
versus inter-class interests. It has already been argued that political life 
is an elite preserve. Hence any policy or measure which would undermine the 
socio-economic foundations of elite formation had to be excluded. The 
neo-colonial capitalist order, above all other things, had to be maintained as 
intact as possible. Any sustained proposals for achieving economic 
indepedence or a redistribution of the social product, therefore, could not be 
entertained. In particular it was necessary to prevent the so-called masses 
from gaining an increased degree of economic, and thus social and political, 
participation. A future political force consisting of peasants and workers 
alone, for example, would represent a substantial challenge to the system of 
power and privilege, not necessarily as a result of any revolutionary program 
which it might advance, but simply because advocating its elementary 
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interests--housing, education, higher wages, social security, etc.--would 
create a strong pressure for socio-economic transformation. 
This is the point at which the notion of inter-class struggle aids our 
understanding and helps to explain, e.g., the C.A. 's attempt to nullify the 
Land Use Decree, which was eventually anchored in the constitution, not by the 
largely elected "representatives of the people, 11 but by the Supreme Military 
Council. In this context, the propagation of the ideology of a "mixed 
economy" and the failure to render enforcable the catalogue of socio-econcomic 
rights (to be discussed presently) becomes transparent. So too, does the 
decision to allow public officials to maintain foreign bank accounts, since 
(we may assume) virtually all the members of the political elite either have, 
or hope to have, funds stored abroad. Here again, it was left to the 
departing Military Government to ban this practice by constitutional provision. 
A political system which consciously excludes popular participation need 
not have a sterile or atrophied political life. On the contrary, such a 
system must, for demagogic reasons of its continuing legitimization, be at 
pains to create the semblance of meaningful political alternatives. The 
well-publicized issues of the Federal Sharia Appeal courts, the creation of 
more states and the banning of corrupt politicians are evidence that the CA 
was much more than a "gentlemen's club. 11 However, these issues were "safe" 
ones in as much as any possible outcomes could not jeopardize the elite's 
leading position. Here intra-class conflict could take its full course. Thus 
the Sharia issue may be best regarded as a struggle for pre-eminence between 
the northern bourgeoisie (who were under-representated in the CA) and the 
southern bourgeoisie. The controversy surrounding the cut-off date for 
banning politicians previously convicted of corruption hinged on whether 
certain individuals, notably Chief Awolowo, would be permitted to take part in 
politics again, and as such was an attempt to settle some long-standing 
intra-elite quarrels. Likewise, the disputes surrounding the creation of more 
States were largely an attempt to create additional "secure" constituencies 
for those political formations who hoped to benefit from them. 
Of course, apart from elite motives, the public interest may also be 
served by the outcomes of such intra-class conflicts as the banning of corrupt 
politicians from political life. It has rightly been suggested that: 
•. . ironically it is only when an issue involves intra-
elite differences that the masses stand a chance of 
getting a fair deal for then the interest of the winning 
group at the time may coincide with the public 
interest.49 
Ideological Obfuscations 
No less than dynamic revolutionary movements, conservative and 
particularist ruling orders require a credible and acceptable ideology or at 
least a collection of pseudo-ideological tenets in order to ensure voluntary 
compliance (or "legitimacy") on the part of the majority of citizens. The 
emerging Nigerian national bourgeoisie found a twofold formula to vindicate 
its class rule in the Second Republic, namely postulating the "mixed economy" 
as a national ideology, and relegating socio-economic rights to the realm of 
remote goals. 
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Concerning the issue of a national ideology in general, the CDC's 
subcommittee on national objectives and public accountability came out 
unequivocally for a unified and unifying belief system. 50 It then went on 
to discuss the substance of this national ideology in terms of Nigeria's 
specific problems and needs, namely the unequal and unjust distribution of 
wealth in society, the co-existence of many potentially antagonistic ethnic 
groups and the overriding need for national unity and development. The 
presence of these factors, the subcommittee concluded, necessitated the 
adoption of socialism.51 
For reasons which will be discussed below, however, the main body of the 
CDC had to prevent these socialist proposals from being realized. Yet, in 
view of popular resentment against certain aspects of capitalism and currents 
favoring socialist solutions, the CDC was not able to reject its 
subcommittee's report outright. Instead, it had to find a formula which, 
while ostensibly conceding the rhetoric of socialist demands, would 
effectively de-fuse them in substance and at the same time would ideologically 
vindicate the continuation of the capitalist economic order. 
The CDC's notion of the "mixed economy" was resurrected--for it bad been 
in use since the early days of the "open-door" phase of the economy--to 
perfonn these functions. The "mixed economy" resembles its counterparts in 
other places in the world--the "welfare state, 11 the "social market economy" or 
the "third way"--in as much as it, like ethnicity or economic nationalism, is 
an ersatz ideology. When socio-economic change is necessary and a large part 
of the population are aware of this fact, but when simultaneously such change 
would threaten the existing system of power and privilege and the position of 
an entrenched elite within it, then demagogic formulae must be concocted and 
propagated which, while giving the appearance of dynamism and progressive 
movement, do not in fact compel any substantial alteration in the status quo. 
Thus the champions of the "mixed economy" start from an abstract notion of 
some fonn of "pure" capitalism, so as to "prove" that the existing variant of 
state capitalism in Nigeria deviates from this model because of state 
ownership of some sectors of the economy and the existence of nominal welfare 
benefits. They then conclude that the given socio-economic system somehow 
incorporates the most desirable elements of capitalism, or indeed achieves a 
"higher" or "optimal II synthesis of the two. In view of all this, any radical-
socialist transformation, it is argued, would upset this hypothetical 
equilibrium between individual initiative and egalitarian redistribution. The 
predominant group within the CDC asserted that: 
••. in point of fact the Nigerian economy is "socialist" in 
certain areas of the economy whilst in other areas 
individual initiative and ownership is permissible. In 
other words, Nigeria has never hesitated to assume full 
ownership or control of sectors of the economy whenever it 
is necessary to do so. At the same time Nigerians have 
always encouraged and protected individual ownership and 
initiative in those sectors of the economy where it is 
felt that public ownership or control is not in the 
national interest.5 2 
Besides, the CDC also argued, socialism is merely an ideology, "conceived 
in a foreign political climate" which, unlike capitalism, is incapable of 
achieving rapid development and an abundance of goods or indeed basic food and 
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shelter for the people. This was so because "it is not possible to _pursue 
simultaneously the aims of rapid development and income equality. 1154 It 
is not difficult to refute this assertion on a factual level. Historical 
evidence shows palpably that capitalism, firstly in the form of colonialism, 
then of nee-colonial dependency, is far from an "indigenous" economic system. 
The state-socialist countries of the world--whatever their deficiencies in the 
area of liberal rights, which the constitution-makers might better have 
attacked--have achieved, in record time, rapid development, economic 
independence;- effective capital formation, and not least of all, a whole 
series of social welfare measures, including food and shelter, for the great 
majority of their populations. 
The "mixed economy 11 itself can also readily be shown to be an exercise in 
ideological obfuscation. It is a well established principle that state 
intervention in and ownership of selected sectors of the capitalist economy, 
particularly in countries proceeding on the capitalist road to development, is 
both desirable and functional. This point has been made above. Control of 
state power by the national bourgeoisie is an effective device for actively 
promoting class interests while subsidizing the "losses" incurred in 
non-profit generating sectors and minimizing the risks which would be 
attendant upon business ventures in a more "purely" capitalist economy. A 
genuinely "mixed" economy, therefore, cannot be defined in terms of degree of 
state ownership alone, but especially in the light of its direction and 
objectives. 55 As a minimum it would have to aim at a qualititive 
transformation of the economic society (Yugoslavia) rather than merely 
describing the extant economic structure. 
It is thus relatively facile to demonstrate that the "mixed economy" 
ideology is intrinsically untenable. This however matters less than the fact 
that it is espoused by large numbers of people, particularly persons in a 
position to co-determine the course of economic development--which indeed is 
the more relevant measure of any ideology's effectiveness, Once the ideology 
has gained wide acceptance, or at least when it is no longer opposed by a 
large, aware, and critical sector of public opinion, it then lends itself to 
the justification of certain policies or actions aimed at preserving the 
existing socio-economic order. In the case of Nigerian constitution-making it 
has led to the separation of socio-economic rights from civil liberties. 
Civil liberties (or liberal rights) have a long and firm tradition in 
Nigerian constitutions and constitutionalism and the provisions of the new 
constitution also provide for the right to life and liberty, the dignity of 
one's person, right of free speech, freedom from arbitrary arrest, religious 
freedom, freedom of movement, etc .--and the right to private property. It 
should be emphasized that--subject to certain well-defined exceptions--these 
liberal rights automatically accrue to all Nigerians. Since they are 
guaranteed by constitution they are enforceable by law. This means that 
anyone who feels that his or her civil rights have been violated may seek 
redress through the courts. The constitution even mandates the National 
Assembly to provide legal aid to indigent citizens whose basic rights appear 
to have been infringed upon. 
The already mentioned CDC subcommittee on national objectives and public 
accountability also proposed to elevate socio-economic rights--right to work, 
right to adequate food and shelter, right to education, right to a minimum 
wage, etc.--to the same level as liberal rights. The subcommittee, in other 
words, sought not only to anchor the principles themselves in the 
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constitution, but also the means of realizing them. It therefore proposed to 
make the principles justiciable to the extent that individuals might apply to 
the courts for a declaration as to whether a state organ or authority were 
performing in accordance with this constitutional mandate. 
The guiding rationale here is evident: that socio-economic rights are a 
pre-condition for the effective exercise of liberal rights, e.g., that the 
right to adequate food and shelter antedates any freedom of movement or 
freedom of conscience. Or, in the words of B. Onimode: 
In particular it is fraudulent to give a country with an 
about 80 percent illiteracy rate freedom of expression in 
official English without offering them [sic] a right to 
formal education. Similarly, bourgeois "right to life" 
and "right to dignity of human person" are plainly 
deceptive in a country where people have to beg to eat or 
starve to death, sleep on the streets,, suffer the 
deprivations and affronts to human dignity.So 
In a manner entirely analagous to the substitutuion of the "mixed economy" 
for concrete formulae of social reform, the CDC then set about appropriating 
for the draft constitution the aura of legitimacy deriving from its ostensible 
espousal of progressive socio-economic principles while similtaneously 
removing these principles from any possibility of being realized. The 
sub-committee I s "directive principles of state policy" became, in the draft 
constitution itself and in the 1979 constitution, "fundamental objectives and 
directive principles of state policy . 11 True, the revised version retained 
most of the socio-economic rights proposed by the sub-committee. But, as the 
respective sub-titles suggest, it transformed them from a binding 
constitutional mandate into a mere declaration of future intent. This 
metamorphosis was achieved by positing that socio-economic rights, unlike 
liberal rights, were only realizable once the facilities had been established 
for them. 57 Socio-economic rights therefore--and again, unlike liberal 
rights--were said not to impose limitations on governmental powers and thus 
could not be made justiciable. 
What is at issue here is no simple shift of emphasis or minor 
phraseological amendment. For the mere assertion of lofty and emotive 
principles, such as socialism, social justice, or socio-economic rights, 
without, however, any provision of the specific and concrete means of 
realizing them, amounts to their neutralization or negation. Moreover, any 
empty invocation of such principles for demagogic purposes does them a 
considerable disservice and makes their ultimate realization more difficult. 
The "socialism" articles in the 1979 constitution are primarily rhetorical in 
intent. No machinery exists for enforcing them or for obtaining redress for 
their non-implementation. And no state authority is actually bound to do 
anything about realizing them. Nor given the basically conservative power 
structure of the Second Republic, is anything likely to be done about 
fulfilling them. 
That this ideological propensity has continued into the civilian era is 
illustrated by a recent statement by Vice President Alex Ekwueme who was 
reported as having warned that the gap between rich and poor would have to 
continue to widen for some time, before narrowing at some future date. The 
move in the direction of egalitarianism would not come about through 
"ideological sermonising" but "by the development of a humanistic and 
enlightened approach engendered 
concretization or quantification 
problematic. 




communalistic heritage. n58 Any 
elevated ideals is, of course, 
Under the conditions already described--centralist tendencies of the 
military regime, the post civil war search for unity, the new balance of 
federalism, the evolution of a national market in the context of a more 
effective division of labor, and the federal role in revenue collection and 
distribution--a "national" bourgeoisie has now emerged, seeking the broader 
scope of national markets, desiring its share of the larger (and proverbial) 
"national cake" and reaping its windfalls from the national economic growth 
measures such as indigenization and federal subventions. Thus the thrust of 
the new constitutional order can be interpreted in terms of this comprehensive 
"nationalization" process. 
The problem of the potential re-emergence of ethno-regionalism is one 
which military rulers and constitution-makers alike attempted to deal with in 
establishing the new elective political institutions. They have rightly 
recognized that the perceived preponderance of any one ethnic or regional 
grouping creates an asymmetry in government which can easily upset the 
delicate equilibrium of the coexistence of Nigeria I s multifarious groups. 
Apparent solutions have been found in the proclamation of the principles of: 
1) Federalism. Unlike previous attempts at creating a functional 
federalism in the form of the Regions of the First Republic or Ironsi' s 
ill-considered (and fatal) attempt to impose unitarism, the new federalism 
perpetuates the military government's 19-State system (whose functionality has 
been analyzed above) and superimposes upon it an extensive structure of checks 
and balances. 
2) The federal character of Nigeria. Among other things, this principle 
requires that the president receive votes from most of the ethno-geographical 
regions (i.e. a majority in at least two-thirds of the 19 States), that the 
legislature contain a house (the Senate) elected on a per-State or territorial 
basis, that the federal cabinet include at least one member from each State, 
that political parties enjoy more than local or regional support, and that the 
personnel composition of all public agencies, apart from the armed forces, 
reflect this federal character. 
These principles, applied to the presidency and the National Assembly, are 
intended to avoid any possible "tyranny of the majority" by ensuring that 
neither the supreme legislative body nor the chief executive can come to and 
remain in power on the strength of support from any one ethnic or regional 
grouping. No doubt this effectively removes one of the First Re pub lie I s 
structural deficiencies. But at the same time the application of these 
principles dilutes the maxim of representation by population. To illustrate: 
if the new National Assembly were unicameral and consisted only of a house 
chosen according to representation by population, then the northern States 
together would retuurn 238 deputies while the southern States would only elect 
209. The Senate, however, as the second house to which each State returns 
five members, helps to restore the balance: the North is represented by 50 
Senators, the South by 45. 
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The States, The 19 State system, as already suggested, has broken down 
the regional power blocs and facilitated a more centralized and unified 
nation-state. The new constitution, whose exclusive and concurrent 
legislative lists underline the power shift from periphery to center, has 
merely enshrined a series of de facto and probably irreversible developments. 
But on the other hand, the new federalism seems to tend to lend itself to 
further fragmentation, For the State boundaries now more nearly approximate 
e.thnic boundaries--though admittedly the three major ethnic groups have been 
distributed over two or more States--and many groups are tending more and more 
toward isolation from other groups even as they are bound more tightly to the 
center. Recent campaigns for the creation of new States clearly reveal 
tendencies toward ethnic or cultural separation. 
The National Assembly. Deputies to the Senate and House of 
Representatives are elected in accordance with the constituency or "first-
past-the-post" system, which means that in each constituency the candidate 
obtaining the largest number of votes is returned to the legislature. All the 
other candidates, regardless of their share of the vote, are excluded. With a 
view to legislatures selected, in various parts of the world, on the basis of 
the first-past-the-post system, we may tentatively conclude two things about 
Nigeria's National Assembly. Since only the most powerful political 
organizations are chosen in each constituency, minority, radical or 
non-conformist interests have been largely submerged; over time the best-known 
and wealthiest parties will likely coalesce to produce a two-party system, 
though even a one-party system cannot be excluded. Secondly, only the 
established dominant social interests are represented in the National 
Assembly. Lawyers in particular, as well as businessmen, top civil servants 
and large landowners tend to predominate. In other words, the single-member 
constituency system of representation tends to product a National Assembly in 
which those classes who are dominant in society and economy also dominate 
politically. 
The Presidency. The introduction of an executive presidency into the 
Nigerian political system has caused a fundamental shift in the structure of 
government. It combines into one office the formerly separated roles of head 
of state and head of government and makes the chief executive electable by a 
national constituency, thus overcoming the need for majority party support for 
every executive measure (vote of confidence). And, by means of a system of 
checks and balances, it establishes separate legislative, executive and 
judicial branches of government. The rejection of the so-called Westminster 
model thus implied is widely seen as a symbolic attempt to cast off any 
remaining colonial institutions and--despite the fact that the new system of 
separation of powers closely parallels the American model--to substitute an 
autochtonous and peculiarly Nigerian solution formulated by Nigerians 
themselves. 
The really striking feature about the Nigerian presidency is the vast 
array of powers attached to it. The president, together with his vice 
president, is the sole democraticlly elected member of the executive-
administrative (or "rule-implementing") branch of government, of which he is 
head. Al 1 other executive officials are appointed and hence not directly 
subject to public scrutiny and control. 
The legislature's much-vaunted powers 
components of the checks and balances system 
that the president has been endowed with 
of impeachment and the other 
notwithstanding, it is evident 
powers--including considerable 
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"emergency powers 11--sufficient to dominate the other two branches of 
government. Moreover, Nigeria's central goal of national development and her 
desire to pass out of the ranks of the "developing countries" further 
contributes to executive strength. For if the Nigerian president occupies 
much the same de jure role as his American counterpart, his de facto powers 
will relatively be substantially greater, since in Nigeria, unlike, say in the 
U.S.A., there are fewer "countervailing forces" to executive power, such as a 
broad middle class, an aware and organized working class, a developed civic 
consciousness which sets limits on what government ought and ought not to do, 
or articulate interest groups to compete for society's resources. 
The presidency therefore is an instrument par excellence for the 
perpetuation of elite domination. As the symbol and executor of national 
unity and economic development, the president promotes the vital interests of 
the emergent national bourgeoisie. Through the medium of periodic national 
elections, the masses have the feeling of participating in the selection of 
national leadership without, however, any possibility of exerting subsequent 
effective control over it. 
The political parties. If the Nigerian political class have thus managed 
to assure their continued ascendancy in the Second Republic, why then have 
they opted for a multi-party rather than a single-party system? The obvious 
answer is that the multi-party system, properly controlled, allows full rein 
to intra-elite rivalries while at the same time precluding any system-
threatening inter-class conflict. Here again, the existence of several 
parties creates the illusion of meaningful choice whereas the single party 
would amount to an admission of open class rule. 
Both the constitution and the electoral decree regard a political party as 
a kind of vote-gathering association. They define a party as including "any 
association of persons whose act1v1t1es include canvassing for votes in 
support of a candidate for election to the Office of President, Vice-President 
Governor, Deputy Governor or membership of a Legislative House or Local 
Government. 11 Only a political party is permitted to canvass for votes or 
contribute funds to a political association or candidate. This definition 
already effectively excludes the candidacy of independents or non-party 
members for elected office, since individuals are not permitted to campaign 
openly or solicit votes. It probably also precludes the social-class based 
party which tends to evolve from an interest association. For instance, a 
trade union, as an association representing the interests of urban workers 
often tends to evolve into a socialist party over time. 
Right from the outset, then, the new political party system contained a 
marked proclivity toward party formation from "above, 11 that is, by a 
relatively few, like-minded individuals who are collectively able to create a 
political association without having to develop gradually from an interest 
group or mass-movement base. And the way in which the political parties were 
admitted favored the establishment of parties headed by well-known 
politicians. The few months which elapsed between the lifting of the ban on 
political activities and the final cut-off date for party registration with 
FEDECO meant that already established politicians with a reservoir of voters, 
workers, active supporters and the remnants of a party organization were in a 
much better position than those who had to acquire all these "from scratch." 
Moreover, the old politicians' contacts with big business and other sources of 
funding meant that they were more easily able to establish the required 
facilities in the various States--party premises were donated, funds were 
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pledged, supporters materialized from virtually nowhere--than were the 
"newbreed" or socialist parties. But the outcome of the party-formation 
process has surely reduced the range of substantial political alternatives, 
has at the same time alienated a number of voters, and has restored political 
leadership to politicians prominent in the First Republic, backed now by the 
leading members of the elite coalition described earlier. 
parties, despite 
hard 1 y re pre sent 
no substantial 
Thus it is abundantly evident that the "new" political 
their enforced democratic orientation and federal character, 
a revolutionary break with the past. As we have seen, 
political alternatives have been allowed to emerge and as 
persons who do not feel their interests represented within the 
away from it or seek extra-system alternatives. 
a result many 
system may turn 
When the quality of political debate declines and parties come to resemble 
each other, then political issues tend to revolve around (1) personalities and 
(2) specific promises for immediate gain. Thus the election campaign 
witnessed an increasing personalization of politics with attention being paid 
to the candidates' (and their families') personality and life style. For the 
same reason there were more and more verbal attacks by the candidates on each 
other. In both cases these developments were caused by the absence of 
substantial issues and ideologies. The second tendency, that of promising 
many things to many people, was a staple practice even before independence. 
If a party is unable to mobilize popular support by means of its ideals, 
policies or goals, it will naturally turn to promises--an appeal to the self-
interest of potential voters. The problem here is that such promises are 
seldom made as part of an overall political strategy but instead amount to a 
catalogue of intentions which, however, can hardly be realized, given the 
limited resources of society, because they are not integrated into a larger 
framework of development and/or redistribution. 
These trends help to explain why all parties have emerged as platform 
parties rather than program parties. A political party which aspires to 
transform society and economy will need a program which contains an analysis 
of existing society, clearly enunciates why that society needs change, and 
explains the aims and methods of its proposed reforms. Such a party, in other 
words, has a dynamic, radical or revolutionary raison d'etre. The raison 
d I etre of the platform party, on the other hand, is the preservation of the 
status quo of which it is itself a pillar and beneficiary. The platform here 
tends to be an uncoordinated and catch-all agglomeration of nebulous promises 
accompanied by slogans disguised as "political principles" (justice, freedom, 
etc.) which, obviously, require no specific course of action on order to be 
proclaimed as accomplished. 
In this context, a closer examination of the crypto- and pseudo-socialist 
remnants in the current party manifestoes might repay one I s concern. Among 
these remnants would be subsumed in particular the many promises to endow the 
people with social welfare benefits. Even assuming that a party elected in to 
Federal or State office should seriously attempt to realize these promises, it 
will not do so--indeed, will not be able to do so--as part of a broader, 
coordinated program of redistribution and transformation, but merely as a 
"giveaway" for which the resources will have to be sought, in different forms, 
from the ostensible "recipients" or "beneficiaries." Such welfare measures as 
pensions, unemployment, insurance and free health care, if inaugurated without 
altering the system of income distribution (e.g. progressive income tax, 
nationalization of industry and large properties, profit ceilings, price 
22 
controls, etc.) can only mean higher deductions from the generality of wage 
earners and increased prices of consumer goods. Social benefits also have to 
be paid for; the question is only: by whom? Similarly, such often-promised 
benefits as universal primary education, presently being effected in isolation 
and not as one element on a comprehensive strategy of development could well 
inundate the economy with over-qualified, under-employed and hence 
dissatisfied "intellectual proletarians." 
Some Conclusions and Prognostications 
In terms of its central purposes--consolidation of the elite-formation 
process, maintenance of the neo-colonial capitalist order, production of 
legitimacy for both of the above--the Second Republic has so far been 
demonstrably successful. Rather than an overwhelming number of competing 
political parties, the system has produced a manageable five relatively 
stab le, system-immmanent political formations which could well be further 
reduced by the end of this electoral period. Although the elections did 
demonstrate that the parties are still largely dependent on an ethnically-
defined mass base, the national electoral machinery and constitutional 
provisions prevented any reversion to the structural factionalism of the First 
Republic. Instead, the necessary "nationalization" of the parties appears 
likely to be achieved via a series of coalitions, since the party leaders must 
be aware of the impossibility of achieving power outside the central state 
apparatus. Alone among the extant political parties, the NPN very early 
realized the importance of achieving nation-wide support and, well before the 
elections, decided to distribute specific inner-party positions to specific 
sectors of the country. 59 As the party most permeated by political 
"heavyweights" from the First Republic and by persons of wealth and status, it 
was able to strike the correct balance of forces most nearly to mirror the 
status quo. But even the NPN has to cooperate with other parties, so far 
mostly in alliance with the NPP. Its 36 out of 95 Senate seats, 168 of 449 
House of Representative deputies, 7 of 19 State governorships and one-third of 
the popular presidential vote (in 12 2/3 of the States, at least'a quarter of 
the votes:) only render it the largest single party, not a predominant 
political force able to govern independently. 
However,--as already suggested--it is part of 
presidential system that the chief executive should 
independently of fluctuating legislative majorities, thus 
stability. 
the logic of the 
be able to govern 
shoring up political 
The more salient issue which all this raises relates to the long-term 
viability of the Second Republic. If in 1979 an overwhelming majority of 
politically aware and active citizens could agree upon a basically bourgeois 
particularist constitution, will the socio-economic order thus ensconsed be 
able to adapt to the growing demands and challenges of the various strata of 
the urban and rural underclasses who will increase with mathematical certainty 
as capitalist development proceeds? Or, like its nineteenth Century European 
analogues will the constitution remain a charter of government for the few? 
These questions are not merely rhetorical, for the long-term social 
development points to a growing contradiction between the elites and the 
masses, this time unmitigated by ethnicity, nationalism or economic 
nationalism. 
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Is it possible that this contradiction may have to be resolved on an 
international plane? Certainly a number of indicators point in this 
direction. As Nigerian industrialization, indigenization and economic growth 
have advanced, so have the country's external interests. During the past 
decade, Nigeria became an important force in West Africa (ECOWAS), Africa 
(OAU), the black community (ACP-Lome pact; anti-Apartheid movement) and in the 
Third World (Group 77). 
In particular, can Nigeria 1 s overtures in West Africa and on the Continent 
as a whole be interpreted as something more than regional solidarity? Certain 
recent assertions indicate that this may be the case: 
1) 
nation 
A newspaper columnist--and this 
that is manifestly destined to lead 
is typical--defines Nigeria 
Africa and the black race. 1160 
as "a 
2) A recent book by the present Senate President, Joseph Wayas, aptly 
entitled Nigeria's Leadership Role in Africa, talks about gaining a 
pre-eminent position in the OAU by countering Senghor' s philosophical, and 
Algeria's ideological leadership claims, not by force of a new idea or 
principle, but by Nigeria: " ••• waging her battle on a territory where she is 
more sure of her potential, that is, on the plane of economic and human 
resources. With her present economic capacity she bas more leverage in the 
leadership game than any other country in the continent. 6111 Elsewhere, he 
suggests the possibility of allowing the present OAU to "die off" so that a 
less unwieldy organization 11 ••• based not on geographical affinity but on 
mutual economic and political interests" might evolve. This new structure, 
"would obviously have to embrace only those Black States of the continent 
whose first loyalty is not to the Arab League. 1162 
3) a communique issued after the last meeting 
International Affairs urges Nigeria to develop 
presumably including nuclear weapons, to match 
country's main enemy on the African continent. 1163 
of the Nigerian Society of 
its military technology, 
the capabilities of "our 
If these utterances are indications of Nigeria's evolution into a "sub-
imperialist power" (to recall a term currently in vogue), then a reasonable 
explanation of the phenomenon can be deduced, not least of al 1, from the 
arguments laid down here. The internal dynamics of a large, under-utilized 
peacetime army (admittedly in part a carryover from the civil war), burgeoning 
foreign-exchange revenues (giving Nigeria a GNP greater than that of all other 
black African countries combined 4 ), a growing industrial-manufacturing 
sector (with a potential need for enlarged markets and perhaps eventually 
sources of raw materials and cheap labor), excessive dependence on a single 
product: oil (and a consequent desire for economic diversification via new 
manufacturing-products and other outlets) internal class contradictions (which 
might be alleviated by nationalism and diversion to such external enemies as 
apartheid), the existence of a functioning liberal democracy (with its 
"magnet effect" particularly on states under one-party or military rule) and 
the new spirit of optimism and self-confidence infusing Nigeria's elites--all 
tend to produce a transnational outlook and constitute the preconditions for a 
policy of expansion and for an attempt to gain hegemony over one's region and 
continent. 
If such a policy were (consciously or unconsciously) pursued, however, it 
would sooner or later encounter yet another contradiction. On the one side an 
extension of Nigerian domination into West Africa, the Continent and the black 
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diaspora, in order to develop capitalist markets, would require the existence 
of capitalist or at least market-oriented economies on the part of the trading 
partners. At the same time Nigerian maintains a dependent liberal-capitalist 
economy and a class-based society, both firmly imbedded in the world 
capitalist economy, and the overwhelming part of its foreign trade is carried 
out with the industrialized capitalist nations. Yet on the other side, in 
order to extend its influence into the neo-colonial areas, Nigerian foreign 
policy must support liberation movements and radical regimes (Patriotic Front, 
Angola, Front-Line states) which, by their anti-imperialist nature, are largly 
radical-socialist oriented, aspire to various forms of collective economic and 
social organization and hence are inimical to Nigerian long-term interests. 
Possible resolutions of such a contradiction would range from the socio-
economic transformation of Nigeria (which, as bas been demonstrated, the 
Second Republic has been established to prevent) to a decision by these 
radical nations to adopt a socio-economic system more congruent with Nigeria's. 
With these considerations, this paper has gone from prognostication to 
speculation. The point of the latter has been merely to illustrate a 
well-documented aspect of elite formation: that any socio-political formation 
based upon too wide a gap between elite and mass will exhibit certain 
structural contradictions and hence will be potentially unstable. The Second 
Republic has postponed resolving this conflict by shifting it onto a "higher, 11 
national plane, but has nevertheless not eliminated it. 
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